JK 526
1916
.R5

Who Wins In November?

The "Inside Politics" that will Decide the Presidency in 1916

BY

DONALD R. RICHBERG

OF THE CHICAGO BAR; FORMER DIRECTOR
PROGRESSIVE NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU

CHICAGO

FREDERICK J. DRAKE & CO.

JK526
1916
.R5

Copyright 1916
By Frederick J. Drake & Co.

SEP 15 1916

©CLA438414

CONTENTS

	PAGE
The Actual Battleground	7
Mexico	12
Preparedness	27
Americanism	30
The Tariff	37
Woman Suffrage	42
Labor	45
Efficiency	53
Progressivism	57
The Party Choice	71
"Minor" Issues	83
Who Wins	87

Who Wins in November?

THE ACTUAL BATTLEGROUND OF 1916.

Should the independent, progressive citizen vote for Wilson or for Hughes? That is the big question in the presidential campaign of 1916.

A conservative partisan republican should have no doubts. He will vote for Hughes. The platform of 1916 presents nothing that is radical. The candidate had an early conservative training as a high grade lawyer—and has given his greatest public service in the Supreme Court of the United States. His mind is open to progressive thinking, but he will never lead his party away from "safe and sane" doctrine.

The conservative partisan democrat should have few doubts. He will vote for Wilson. The President may be pretty radical in policy and the platform is fairly progressive, but his southern-controlled party will not be driven into any marked radicalism in legislation or administration. Furthermore the party is in power, and self-interest will hold its conservative vote in line to continue that power.

The progressive democrat will vote for Wilson because he is convinced of Wilson's progressivism and will wish to approve and continue his administration.

The marking of the ballot on November 7, 1916, is already settled for the major number of these groups.

There remain the progressive former-republicans and the independents, perhaps three to four million men and women, enough to determine the election. Each party realizes that a majority of these must be won over to its side to bring victory. Each party is seeking to cap-

ture these progressive-independents and so the issues they are expected to decide are clouded in the dust of the battle fought around them. Both parties declare for equal suffrage and then the republican candidate plays a trump card by announcing himself in favor of a constitutional amendment. Both parties declare for the protection of children and then the democratic president plays a trump card by forcing congress to pass an anti-child-labor law. In the Mexican muddle the republican candidate declares vigorously for the protection of American lives and property. The democratic candidate replies that he will not shed American blood merely to protect the capital of those investors who voluntarily choose the risks of exploiting the resources of a foreign country.

Where is the progressive, independent citizen to obtain condensed information, free from party bias and the prejudice of self-interest, on which to make up his own

mind as to what the real issues are and whom he would put in power to act for him in solving these national problems? Campaign literature, newspaper and magazine stories, inevitably shaped to accord with editorial policy, are inefficient guides. It requires much more time and thought than the average man or woman will give from daily work and amusement, to arrive at safe judgment through these sources of information.

It is the purpose of this writing to present in brief form the real issues between candidates and parties as shown by documents and performances, supplemented by the writer's intimate knowledge of much of the "inside politics" and "invisible government" of recent years. This book is not written as a brief for either party. There is no effort to argue the case, but simply to present the evidence on both sides. Here are a few vital facts from which opposite conclusions may be reached by men of opposing tempera-

ments, but whereby each reader may determine for himself how *he* can use *his* vote to express *his* desires and *his* interests in the public service and to put in office those who will most nearly represent *him*.

MEXICO

It is the evident republican intention to make Mexico one of the main issues of the campaign. The conflict here is between the candidates. Will you choose Wilson or Hughes to act for you? Party platforms and party orators shoot blank cartridges in foreign affairs. The President controls and directs foreign policy with power limited very little except by public opinion—which he can usually incline to his judgment.

Wilson's actions in Mexico, inconsistent and unsatisfactory in many ways, have been based on certain fixed ideas. Hughes' criticism is founded on opposing ideas and there is a fairly clear choice offered to the voter between the two men. Let us consider first the Wilson policy and then the Hughes alternative.

A LEGACY FROM TAFT

The Mexican problem was bequeathed to Wilson by Taft. Madero had been President of Mexico, the victor in a war for the poor against the strong-arm rule of Diaz for the benefit of the rich. Madero was an idealist, in many ways impractical, putting too much faith in the ability of a down-trodden, uneducated people to understand their own interests and support their friends. His General Huerta was treacherous, cruel and greedy. Madero was imprisoned, tortured to force him to abdicate, and finally murdered. Huerta seized the government, and, backed by the largest number of soldiers and with great financial power ready to aid him, sought recognition from the United States.

Recognition of Huerta could have been based on the demand, voiced by Hughes in this campaign, that he should guarantee protection of American lives and prop-

erty. He was the strong man in Mexico and with recognition probably could have made good this guarantee. But the American people at that time on a popular vote would have rejected overwhelmingly the proposal to recognize the "red-handed traitor". The President undoubtedly expressed the outraged moral sentiments of the country in refusing recognition.

The Mexican government promptly became a chaos of fighting interests. Warring leaders ruled shifting sections of the country — Huerta, Villa, Carranza, Zapata and lesser men, varying from half-civilized national politicians to savage local bandits.

TWO POSSIBLE POLICIES

American influence could be exerted in only two ways: First, armed intervention; second, support of the most capable Mexican leader who could be supported with self-respect.

INTERVENTION?

Intervention meant the raising of an army of 500,000 men (by conscription, for it is plain there would have been few volunteers) and embarking on a conquest which would cost thousands of lives, millions of dollars and imperiled our cordial relations with all South and Central America. It meant that we would have the Mexican problem on our hands for a generation or more. How should the United States recover its losses? Should we be compensated by money, by annexed territory or merely by our consciousness of duty well done? After the great cost of money and blood spent to intervene, would not the nation demand annexation? With our problem of the Indians solved only by their extermination and our problem of the great colored population of the South yet unsolved, were we to add the problem of making

citizens or subjects out of several million enslaved and hopelessly ignorant peons?

WE MUDDLE ALONG

The President rejected the solution of intervention and here again he undoubtedly represented the wishes of the American people. By special agents, through all manner of sources, the President sought to learn who the strong man of Mexico might be whom we could support. Meanwhile we "muddled along". American citizens were killed in Mexico, American women were barbarously maltreated, American property was destroyed, and yet our Government took no decisive steps.

Of many of our acts and our failures to act we cannot but feel heartily ashamed. The Tampico incident was one of the worst, where American warships in the harbor were withdrawn on direct orders from Washington while our citizens, threatened with death and things worse than death

by the Mexican mob, were rescued by British and German ships. Our loss of self-respect and national pride—our loss in the respect of other nations—from such events is great and lasting. It is the traditional first duty of every nation to protect its citizens in foreign lands and even the weaker nations form alliances with greater powers in order to fulfill this duty. We can not relax our national pride and courage to protect our citizens abroad without sacrificing not only each man's pride in his citizenship and his personal safety outside his own country but also his ability to meet equally other nationalities in the markets of the world. We lose honor and prosperity in the same disgrace.

WILSON'S DEFENSE

There is a powerful defense for the Wilson policy, however, despite the admitted shame of the record at Tampico, the humiliation of taking and then abandoning Vera Cruz, and the Carrizal mas-

sacre. Americans were warned to leave Mexico. It was a country almost in anarchy where we could only protect them at a disproportionate cost of lives and money to our people. Plainly we would not be expected to subjugate Central Africa because some savage tribe killed American hunters or missionaries. The question is, where to draw the line, between a country where the citizen abroad takes his own risk and one where his government protects him. Our government ordinarily protects its people, by calling on the responsible foreign government to protect them, and if there is no responsible government, it may be thought the duty of Americans to flee the foreign country and not ask us to pacify it to protect them.

Furthermore many of the large American interests in Mexico had done their full share in the exploitation of the country at the expense of the inhabitants, and much of the clamor for our government to

insure safety in Mexico came from those who were not wholly irresponsible for the unhappy condition there and whose noisy demands to protect lives covered a more anxious desire for the protection of highly profitable investments.

A SIDE-LIGHT

There is another side-light cast upon the President's policy which has received little or no publicity. During the first year or so of the present administration Wilson was endeavoring against great opposition to force certain constructive measures through Congress which he regarded as of vast importance in our domestic affairs — notably the currency bill creating the Federal Reserve Board. It required all the presidential pressure, aided by alert public interest, to carry this program through. Whether rightly or wrongly convinced, it is stated on the best authority, that the President *was* convinced that much of the Mexican agitation

in this country had as a strong incentive the desire to block his domestic program. Financiers opposing the currency bill had a common cause, if not a common money interest, with financiers involved in Mexico. Of course if the country were excited to demand Mexican intervention and Congress thrown into a whirlpool of war measures, there would be a speedy end to all domestic law-making. If we had adopted a vigorous, aggressive policy toward Mexico in 1913 it may be seriously doubted whether the new laws, which form the record on which Wilson seeks re-election, would ever have been adopted.

THE QUESTION FOR HUGHES

The final excuse for all that is unhappy and truly shameful in the Mexican muddle is found in the question that Hughes must answer to defeat Wilson on this issue: "What better could you have done?" The American people didn't want Huerta recognized, so we didn't do it—

and there was chaos. We had no army adequate to police Mexico and the people didn't want us to draft an army—because they didn't want to intervene. No decent leader in Mexico became big enough to be recognized—until Carranza crawled up on top—and, though he is far from strong, he is the best we have found, so we have tried to get along with him.

There is the situation: We haven't played a very fine part in this Mexican business. In fact, for a big country we have looked pretty small. If Hughes can show a good policy he is entitled to approval over Wilson on this issue because on results the Wilson policy has not been very good—except that, up to date, he has "kept us out of war"; that is, American citizens and soldiers have been robbed and slain, but we haven't raised an army and invaded Mexico. What would Hughes have done?

HUGHES' POSITION

The Hughes' position appears about as follows:

First—The President should have adopted a definite policy and carried it out—in order to preserve our respect as a nation and to insure some kind of order continuously in Mexico. Instead we watched and waited and vacillated from action to non-action, so that we lost the respect of other nations and insured the continuation of disorder in Mexico.

Second—As an example of the harm of a changing policy, note the embargo on arms. If we had adopted a policy of helping the existing government we should have let arms through to that government. If we had adopted a policy which might eventually require us to intervene, we should have prevented our prospective enemies from getting arms with which to fight us. Instead, we ruined the existing

government by stopping arms (among other methods), and then we let arms through to men who are now fighting us.

Third—Even if we refused to recognize Huerta on moral grounds, we should have kept hands off so that if he were able he could have eventually pacified Mexico completely. (Apparently this position looked toward Huerta's eventual recognition—when he had "justified" his crimes by entire success and the edge of our moral rage had been blunted by time. This alternative seems to mean that we should never have officially recognized the Mexican government until Huerta's death or overthrow, but meanwhile there would have been a tyrannical peace in the house of our neighbor. If Huerta's disease, from which he recently died, could have been diagnosed accurately in 1913, this policy of "watchful waiting" might have been regarded as most scientific statecraft.)

RECOGNIZE HUERTA

Fourth—The eventful Hughes position as it is being developed appears most certain in its results and to present the squarest alternative to the Wilson policy. In his Chicago speech—August 8—he said that the administration should have said to Huerta: "We will recognize you if you can perform your international obligations, if you have got a real government that can discharge its duties—we won't recognize unless we are satisfied that you have". In the same speech Hughes denounced the destruction of the only government that Mexico had because we did not like the moral character of Huerta—and condemned also "meddlesome interference with what does not concern us."

A CLEAR ISSUE

Here is a clear issue between Wilson and Hughes. Back of the Hughes policy is the time-honored theory of statecraft in

foreign affairs: All we demand of another country is that the responsible government protect American lives and property within its borders and live up to its international obligations to us. We are not concerned with the manner in which control of government is obtained or exercised in that country so long as our interests are protected. We are not concerned with the character of the government or its rulers, nor with the welfare of other peoples under other governments. Our obligation in foreign affairs is the protection of Americans and their interests and that alone.

Back of the Wilson policy is the newer (but not necessarily therefore better or even practical) theory that we have spiritual obligations as a nation whereby we can not give aid and comfort and have friendly intercourse with governments or rulers that offend our moral sense—that we must exercise in international affairs a moral, as well as a self-protective force.

It may be well to consider that the international reformer, like the local reformer, is likely to be met with the suggestion that his own house must be in perfect order before he passes judgment on his neighbor's housekeeping. And yet more practically it should be considered that the active exercise of moral force in international affairs requires a backing of physical force or else the consequences may be embarrassing and even disastrous. To succeed with a policy of aggressive morality will require a supporting policy of equally aggressive military and naval preparedness.

But these suggestions only affect the practical carrying out of the policy chosen. The issue in this campaign between the Wilson foreign policy and the Hughes foreign policy is made plain by their attitudes toward Mexico. Let the voter understand the essential differences in the two points of views and then decide which he desires to be the policy of America in foreign affairs. That is the big Mexican issue.

PREPAREDNESS

The issue of preparedness was raised by Colonel Roosevelt with such effect that, prior to the conventions, President Wilson made a short speaking campaign through the middle west advocating a limited but substantial increase in our military and naval force. Between his position and the Roosevelt demand for universal service it appeared that a question of vast importance might be decided in this campaign. Then the democratic congress adopted a program so utterly inadequate to meet the demands of the Secretary of War that, when the President receded from his advanced position and failed to support his cabinet officer, the Secretary of War resigned.

DIFFERENCES NOT FUNDAMENTAL

A great opportunity to make this one of the fundamental and genuine issues of the

campaign was presented. But the republican platform and the republican candidate have rejected the opportunity. The issue as made is rather one of method than of program. The democrats are criticized for their changes in policy and for their ineffectiveness in increasing our defensive forces. But the program of preparedness as announced by Hughes is uncertain in terms and indefinite in amount. Hughes in his acceptance speech demands a "reasonable increase in the regular army" and "that the first citizen reserve subject to call should be enlisted as a federal army and trained under federal authority."

Between this program and the Wilson program there is not sufficient certainty of choice so that anyone should cast a presidential vote for one or the other with "preparedness" as a decisive issue. Unless one of the candidates takes a more certain and radical position than either has taken to date "preparedness" talk from

either camp should receive no consideration by the independent voter. It may be admitted that the administration has been culpably slow in preparing for our obvious need of increased military protection; but if the opposition has no definite program to present in the campaign, it may be assumed that it would likewise move very slowly when placed in power.

AMERICANISM

The issue of "Americanism" is likewise one largely made vital through Roosevelt's thundering attacks on the "hyphenates." But here again what bid fair to be an important issue has lost much of its force in its handling by the two parties and candidates. Yet undoubtedly there are certain prejudicial factors included under this title which may weigh heavily in the campaign, and the exact situation should be clearly understood in order that patriotic voters may not be "delivered" by professional trouble makers against their true convictions.

SYMPATHY WITH EUROPEAN POWERS

Certain facts are indisputable. With all our official and private desire to be neutral *in action,* a clear majority of

Americans are pro-Ally *in sympathy.* This sympathy was partly the result of ancestry, language, tradition and private interest and partly the result of effective pro-Ally publicity at the start of the war. The German sympathizers, in minority numbers, resented this attitude and much of what they felt was unfair and manufactured hostility to the Central powers.

And, feeling at a disadvantage, the German sympathizers became quite aggressive in the assertion of their point of view. Then came general condemnation of the official German activities in fighting the English blockade and in attempting justifiably to influence favorable public opinion here and in attempting quite unjustifiably to hamper munition making here. Approval of this official German aggressiveness was mistakenly assumed to follow upon sympathy for Germany among Americans of German blood and certain professional German-Americans aided the popular misapprehension by championing

Germany's offensive against us indiscriminately with her offensive against the Allies.

"HYPHENATES"

Roosevelt's attack on the "hyphenates" was primarily an attack on the latter small group—men who had so professionalized their championship of Germany that they failed to see or refused to see where they had become disloyal Americans. But in the vigor of his attack Roosevelt swept into a common enmity to him the small group of true "hyphenates" and the larger masses of Americans of German blood who were only German sympathizers and not in a shade of thinking disloyal to America. The latter were as outraged by the Lusitania and the attacks on munition plants as any American sympathizing with the Allies, but they bitterly resented the violence and breadth of the Rooseveltian condemnation.

GERMAN-AMERICAN POLITICS

As a result of this situation when the German-American Alliances swung the club of the German-American vote in the preconvention campaign they paradoxically spoke for many voters who were thoroughly opposed to any attempt to "deliver" a racial vote and yet were so hostile to Roosevelt that they did not want to be forced to a choice between him and Wilson. It is the firm conviction of the vast number of sympathizers with Germany that Wilson is personally wholly pro-Ally; that his "neutrality" is a sham and his purposes anti-German. It is useless to discuss the bases for these ideas, as all the arguments are smothered in prejudices. And it is so utterly unpatriotic for an American to cast his ballot for President on the basis of a foreign sympathy or antipathy, that only the fact of this prejudice is mentioned. The truth or falsity of the idea ought to

be wholly irrelevant to a consideration of issues of this campaign.

HUGHES AND THE PRO-GERMANS

The threat of German-American opposition to Roosevelt played some part in the nomination of Hughes. How large a part no one can possibly tell, when so many factors were under consideration by so many men. Certainly no such large part as the professional "hyphenates" would like to have believed. There can be no doubt that if Hughes were regarded as the German-American candidate he would be beaten overwhelmingly. There can be no doubt that he is not such a candidate. He has gone far in his stand for "undiluted Americanism" to repudiate the suggestion. He has denounced "covert policies" and " the use of our soil for alien intrigues." There is no possible toleration of a divided loyalty in his words, actions or record. He has plainly sought to avoid offending in mass those loyal Americans of German

sympathy who felt themselves included in the great sweep of the Roosevelt rebukes. But if the "hyphenate" group insists upon working for Hughes' election as a German-American triumph, the important issue will be raised of the success of a political group organized on anti-American lines. If this issue is raised Hughes will be forced to repudiate his supporters or accept a support which will insure defeat.

"AMERICA FIRST"

Both candidates stand for a pure Americanism; America first and America alone holding the allegiance of its citizens. There ought to be no real issue here. Only utter mismanagement of the campaign can make one. There undoubtedly are many voters who will vote for Hughes to beat Wilson because they do not feel that Wilson has been fair to the country that has their sympathy. And because of these votes there will also doubtless be many who will vote for Wilson to rebuke what they

feel is the disloyalty of those who vote against him on account of foreign sympathy. The independent intelligent voter who is truly patriotic, and wishes to serve his country with his vote will accept both candidates as exponents of pure Americanism and vote for the one whose administration he believes will be best for the United States. The only Americanism issue in this campaign is not between the candidates but the voters—will they stifle all foreign sympathies and vote simply as Americans? But if any considerable group campaigns on the basis of foreign sympathy they will reap the whirlwind of an overwhelming opposition to the unfortunate candidate whom they ruin with their support.

THE TARIFF

The tariff has been for decades a great and vital issue between the republican party advocating import duties for the "protection of American industries" and the democratic party advocating "tariff for revenue only." There will be much tariff talk in the present campaign, but honest analysis of the two party positions will show that underlying differences in program are no longer clear cut, and that by the test of probable performances of the party in power, the tariff question is now a sectional rather than a national issue. The protective tariff of the republican party has always been largely a tariff in favor of New England. The democratic party with its main strength in the South is peculiarly forced to protect the industries valuable to the prosperity

of the "new South." "Tariff for revenue only" has become a meaningless slogan. Both parties uphold the protective principle, the republicans avowedly, the democrats evasively.

"LOG-ROLLING"

Tariff making has always been a matter of "log-rolling." Representatives in Congress traded their votes for protection of the industries in other districts in exchange for protection of their home industries.

In districts where there were great industries profiting largely through a protective tariff it was practically impossible for a congressman to be elected who was not pledged to "deliver" and able to "deliver" the high tariff duties wanted by those industries. In plain language, successful tariff-making for each congressman was a matter of exchanging his votes for schedules wanted by other congressmen for their constituents in exchange for

votes for schedules wanted by his constituents.

TARIFF COMMISSION

The results of such tariff-making were so bad for the whole country and so unfair to American consumers that there was a wide demand for a Tariff Commission to gather impartially and make available the statistics which should guide honest tariff making, which statistics are now produced largely by representatives of protected industries—and hence partisan and unreliable. There is no issue over this proposal, however, since between the "non-partisan commission" of the democrats and the "expert" commission of the republicans there is little choice. Possibly the democrats speak a bit more bravely and the republicans from past performance give better promise of living up to their weaker words. But it should be understood that neither party will do anything except continue a protective tariff and

both parties will desire to raise as much revenue as possible to meet increasing expenditures. The real issue on the tariff is, that if the democrats fix the duties they will favor particularly those sections of the country where the democracy is strong, the South and certain industrial centers in the North; and if the republicans fix the duties they will favor particularly the sections of their strength, notably New England and that part of the middle west east of the Mississippi.

PARTY POLICIES

These broad tendencies may be noted and fairly stated: (1) The democratic party will incline toward a low tariff and the republican party toward a high tariff. (2) The tariff will inevitably favor somewhat the sections where the party in power is strongest and so be sectional by whichever party it is made. It is however true that the democratic party is still distinctly the party of sectionalism and the republi-

can, the party of nationalism. (See later discussion under "The Party Issue"). Therefore a democratic tariff may be reasonably expected to show more sectional favoritism than a republican tariff.

Traditional thought will induce many to choose Hughes or Wilson, mainly on the tariff issue. A safer judgment for the independent voter is to regard this as a local issue by which he may determine his vote for congressman and to select his president on more decisive national issues.

WOMAN SUFFRAGE

On the question of woman suffrage there is a real and plain issue between Wilson and Hughes. Between the party platforms there is little choice. Between the leaders and between the rank and file of the parties there is a clear choice.

In the first place, Wilson and Hughes have both arrived at a position favoring suffrage from original opposition. But it may be truly stated that Wilson has come reluctantly and Hughes has come gladly. As a result, Wilson clings to his party program and wants the question settled by the States while Hughes goes beyond his party program and flatly favors a constitutional amendment. Many argue that there is no real diffierence here because three-fourths of the States must approve a constitutional amendment before it becomes a law. But the argument is falla-

cious. Those desiring the speedy granting of woman suffrage know full well that the proposal of a constitutional amendment by congress and a campaign for ratification by three-fourths of the States is the way of least resistance to their goal.

CANDIDATES ON SUFFRAGE

Between the candidates, those who regard the suffrage issue as paramount will logically vote for Hughes—and those who regard it as important will weigh the issue heavily in his favor.

PARTIES ON SUFFRAGE

Between the parties, the suffrage issue also presents a fair choice. There are powerful anti-suffrage leaders in the republican party and strong pro-suffrage leaders in the democracy, but on the whole the republican party contains the largest numerical support for woman suffrage and the democratic party the largest numerical opposition.

The states rights democrats oppose the speedy national amendment; large foreign groups of their voters represent traditional antagonism; large conservative groups, particularly in the South, believe in the ancient limitations of "woman's sphere" and are not impressed with the rights of the independent woman worker, with which the East and North are more familiar.

The actual grant of woman suffrage has come largely in the republican states and women's influence in that party is important and effective. The progressive-republicans are another force in their party much more powerful than the progressive democrats in theirs. It is a simple fact that the republican party is an organization far more friendly to woman suffrage and far more likely to advance that cause than the democratic party. The issue here is plain and the only real question for the voter is: How much importance shall this issue be given in his final judgment?

LABOR

In considering the attitude of the candidates and parties toward the living and working conditions of the wage-earners we find contradictory facts and forces. Hughes may be said to represent the republican thought fairly well, although he has by no means adopted the full program of the advanced progressives. Wilson, on the other hand, is far ahead of his party rank and file on labor questions. It may be argued plausibly that the President's activity in such matters as forcing through the child labor bill is based on policy rather than on a crusader zeal for legislation in the interest of working men and women. But achievement is more important than motive and the President can rightly claim the position of a friend of labor. Yet the democratic party, although containing the bulk of the manual workers, is so organ-

ized as to be far less responsive to their needs than the republican party.

WHICH PARTY FAVORS LABOR

Raymond Robins, former democrat and Chairman of the Progressive National Convention, determined to cast his future political fortunes with the republican party largely because he regarded it as the most efficient instrument to improve working conditions. He wrote:

"The fixed Southern control of the Democratic Party is individualistic in its thinking, sectional in its sympathies and inherits a tradition against common labor as servile. * * * The Democratic primary voter mass control in the industrial cities is the most heterogeneous of our national groups and the excessive pressure of living and industrial conditions renders it the most fertile field for boss control in the service of selfish personal and corporate interests."

Mr. Robins went on to show that the

most notable advances in progressive legislation (which term includes largely legislation for the improvement of living and working conditions) have been made in those states where the progressive element has been able to overthrow the conservative control of the republican party and through that party carry the local government forward. It is true that much has been accomplished nationally under Wilson but the careful observer will note that the democratic party has been *driven* forward and the republican party has been *led* forward.

TO BE LED OR DRIVEN

This difference is more important than it may seem at first glance. Not merely is an unwilling servant less efficient but the means necessary to force legislation from an unwilling legislator are harmful to the balance of the administration. The use of patronage and personal pressure on a congressman to obtain his vote means weak-

ness in other departments of government with sometimes far reaching consequences. A "horrible example" is presented by our recent history. The appointment of Mr. Bryan as Secretary of State must have been made not only from considerations of political debt to him who made the President's nomination possible, but also because the support of the Bryan men in Congress was absolutely essential to put through the President's program of legislation. Wilson obtained the domestic legislation he demanded and the United States suffered immeasurably in consequence from the Bryan diplomacy during the greatest war in history when the services of a trained and competent Secretary of State would have been of untold value to the future of our country.

If the party in power had been *led* to support progressive measures instead of *driven,* the President would have had behind the congressmen in their districts a demand for the legislation he desired, to

which he could have appealed to coerce selfish or narrow-minded public officers, and it would not have been necessary to embarrass the public service in order to take care of "deserving democrats." This is why the public opinion in the party is as important to consider as the opinion of the party leader.

HUGHES AND WILSON

It should not be thought that Hughes is not a "friend of labor." But the argument that the Wilson performances are to be weighed as heavier than the Hughes promises, while entitled to due consideration, should be measured with the argument that the republican party has shown itself in performance to be more responsive to progressive demands for labor legislation than the democratic party.

THE DEMOCRATIC VOTERS

At the same time it should be considered that the rank and file of the democratic

party contains a far larger number of those to be immediately benefited by labor legislation than the republican party. The believer in democracy may well argue that the workers themselves are those who will do the most for their own good and that those who wish them well should work with the party wherein they are most largely represented. The opposing argument is that the hard driven industrial worker, whose wage is close to the line of absolute necessity and to whom the least disaster, such as sickness or injury, threatens loss of food and clothing and shelter, has little time or ability to plan out the ultimate improvement of his conditions. Furthermore a group of voters under such pressure is easily swayed by temporary self interest to vote for a generous candidate or helpful local boss against their own larger interests. It is the history of most reform movements that support must come first from those in more secure and comfortable circumstances, with education and

leisure sufficient to enable them to think and act upon the needs of tomorrow—those not wholly absorbed in the bread-winning problem of today.

THE CHOICE

To those interested in progressive labor legislation Wilson presents a record of performance and has definitely "taken that side." Hughes presents fair promises and an open mind, expressing his philosophy in these words:

> "We shall not have any lasting prosperity unless we buttress our industrial endeavors by adequate means for the protection of health; for the elimination of unnecessary perils to life and limb; for the safeguarding of our future through proper laws for protection of women and children in industry; for increasing opportunities for education and training. * * * We make common cause in this country not for a few but for all; and our watchword must be co-operation, not exploitation."

Between the parties, the democratic party presents a record of recent creditable performance under pressure; and of fundamental conservative control; the republican party has a creditable record of victories of its progressive element in the past; and of a fundamental progressive control.

EFFICIENCY

It is customary for the party out of power to charge the party in power with waste of public money and general inefficiency in government. It is doubtful whether such charges interest many except the partisans who are already convinced. The decision of Hughes to devote considerable time to that issue in this campaign can not be based on a desire to appeal to this ancient and rather ineffective prejudice, but rather on two facts. First, the candidate himself is distinctly an efficient man, calm, practical and industrious, unwilling to substitute rough guesses for hard facts. Hence he is truly outraged at the general inefficiency of our national government, with its log-rolling appropriations and lack of even an attempt at budget-making. Second, the recent administration has given some glaring ex-

amples of bad appointments and bad management.

WASTE INEVITABLE

The independent voter will, however, remember too much inefficiency in the government of the last five decades largely under republican control to feel that this is peculiarly a sin of the democratic party. Indeed a certain amount of waste and incompetence seems an essential part of popular government. The only pertinent questions in this campaign are: Has the Wilson administration been exceptionally inefficient? Is the democratic party naturally more inefficient than the republican?

Without going into a mass of statistics, which partisans will dispute, it may be justly stated that the administration has been confronted with a great many unusual problems and that under the blundering guidance of various officials of perhaps slightly unusual incapacity some

notably poor governing has been done. Most of the chairmen of important congressional committees since 1912 arrived at those positions solely through seniority of service, being regularly re-elected from safe democratic districts in the South. Some of these men, who had attained great power through small abilities, were exceptionally selfish and narrow-minded public servants. On the whole, balancing an energetic and resourceful President against a mediocre cabinet, decayed congressional leaders, and greedy small fry officials demanding patronage for a party hungry from long absence from power, it may be said that the Wilson administration has been below the average grade in general efficiency of government.

THE PARTY AVERAGE

In regard to a choice between parties, it may be assumed that usually efficiency and intelligence will be found in about equal quantities and that the more intelligent

districts will generally produce the more intelligent public officials. The republican party is strongest in those sections of the country representing the highest literacy, and it may be asserted without reflection on the individual democrat that the average of republican efficiency in national politics is higher than the democratic average.

This brief consideration of efficiency has been purposely general and philosophical. Campaign orators may produce statistics by the pound, but nothing will convince the average man that one party is more efficient than another, except a prejudice or an instinctive judgment based on pretty vague theoretical reasoning. After the voter has convinced himself in this manner statistics and argument will fall on deaf ears, so there is no effort to encumber this document with such wastebasket material.

PROGRESSIVISM

The issue considered under the heading of "progressivism" is not the attitude of candidates and parties toward progressive doctrines. The issue is rather the choice of those who wish to see progressive citizens unite on a political program to make progressivism a dominant force in either the majority or minority party. Whether Wilson or Hughes appears to be the logical leader of this group will be determined by a consideration of all the campaign issues and the candidates' personalities. Whether the republican or democratic party offers the best machinery is discussed under "The Party Choice." But in addition there should be a brief survey of the reasons for the failure of the party dedicated to progressivism and the political lesson thereby taught. The story of the formation of the Progressive Party is well-known and a complete recital of its

internal difficulties would fill a volume, but the last chapter of its existence may be written down as a useful explanation of why the party died and why a majority of its leaders have endorsed the republican candidate.

PROGRESSIVE RESENTMENT

Many ardent progressives have felt that their party was betrayed, and in their first resentment, were inclined toward voting for Wilson as a rebuke to those leaders whom they had trusted and who, they felt, had tried to "deliver" them to their ancient enemies. So many half-truths and downright falsehoods have been circulated about the Progressive National Convention of 1916 that a brief history of the events leading up to the convention and of the convention itself may aid in the formation of accurate progressive judgment. The limitations of space and obligations of private confidence will prevent complete presentation of the evidence. But the fol-

lowing narrative is strictly reliable and based almost wholly on first-hand knowledge.

THE DEFEATS OF 1914

The beginning of the end of the Progressive Party came in the elections of 1914—where a group of national candidates of ability, reputation, character and devotion to public service unsurpassed, were presented by the Progressives in different sections of the country—and ran third! That answered the questions: Do the American people want a great third party? Has the Republican party ended its usefulness? The answer to both was, No.

Progressive national leaders promptly conferred and divided on the issue: Shall we end our fight now and announce that we are through? It was decided to go on through 1916, but in no spirit of hope for ultimate triumph. The decision was based purely on expediency—on the determina-

tion that progressive principles could be best advanced by holding together the diminishing army of voters to be swung in a decisive hour to make one of the old parties the future political instrument of progressivism.

THE ROOSEVELT STRENGTH

The political strength of the progressive party was largely dependent on the political strength of Colonel Roosevelt. The moral force of the brilliant and high-minded group of leaders, the idealism of a large proportion of the rank and file were factors which opposing politicians could not overlook; but the immediate political power of the party lay in the personal popularity of the "foremost private citizen in the world."

The year 1915 marked perhaps the low-tide record in Roosevelt's political strength. His prestige had suffered greatly from the declining voting power of the progressives. He was hammering

away at unpopular doctrines—demanding preparedness and daily adding to the hostility of the "hyphenates"—without yet having convinced the country of its dangers from foreign attack and internal disloyalty. It was therefore with a keen realization of their losses in numbers and in the power of their chief that the progressive leaders planned for the presidential campaign of 1916. There were a few persistently hoping for, or even believing in, a revival of the party in the national campaign and in the return of the old "Teddy" popularity. But the majority (including certainly Colonel Roosevelt, who is not inclined to over-estimate his own strength) felt that the party had no future as an independent force, but must throw its power in aid of a more permanent organization.

THE PROGRAM ADOPTED

A majority of progressives were former republicans as was their national leader,

and the natural course was so to utilize the progressive power as to compel the adoption of a progressive platform and naming of a progressive candidate by the republican party. The means adopted were so obvious that only their candor saved them from appearing ridiculous. The progressive convention was called for the same day and in the same city as the republican—Chicago, June 7. A statement announced the desire to unite the parties on platforms and candidates, if possible. As a paragrapher heartlessly described it, the progressive party advertised that it would be on a certain corner at a certain time, wearing a red carnation and that its intentions were matrimonial.

PRE-CONVENTION SKIRMISHING

From the date of the progressive announcement in January until the conventions met, constant negotiations were in progress between responsible leaders in the republican and progressive parties.

In each party was a group of uncertain solidarity, which, with a united purpose, could probably sway the party decision. Let this be termed the "executive group." The progressive executive group made one early mistake in judgment of far-reaching consequence. It underestimated the political strength which Colonel Roosevelt and his program would have in June —a strength which from January to June increased at a rate which astounded even the most optimistic.

As a result of this error the progressive executive group swung the party power as a negative instead of as a positive force. It was argued that there was enough vitality in the party to defeat a non-acceptable republican running on a non-progressive platform. But it was not sincerely urged that Roosevelt as the progressive nominee might beat a reactionary republican so badly that even if he did not defeat Wilson the campaign would finish the republican party—because the executive group

did not believe this to be reasonably possible. Yet by June it was plain that this position should have been taken by Progressive leaders.

THE SITUATION ON JUNE 7, 1916

To sum up months of political skirmishing, this was the situation when the conventions met on June 7. The republican and progressive executive groups both were certain that Roosevelt would not run against Hughes, and that he might run against anybody else. The choice of the republicans for possible victory with a "reunited party" was Hughes or Roosevelt. Any other choice meant certain defeat. The progressive executive group wanted the progressive convention to wait and see what the republicans would do. In view of the extraordinary rise in the Roosevelt strength they thought there might be a chance to retrieve the earlier mistake and persuade the republicans to nominate Roosevelt—not by fear of his opposition

(that ace had been discarded) but by belief that he would be the strongest opponent for Wilson. If this effort failed, it was the plan that the progressives should endorse Hughes after his nomination.

THE CONCEALED PLAN

This plan of the executive group was not fully revealed to the progressive delegates in order to avoid the opposition of the more radical progressives. The disheartening muddle of the end of the convention was the result of this policy of concealment which may be regarded as the second major error in the progressive strategy. There was a powerful sentiment in the progressive convention in favor of nominating Roosevelt—not alone because of devotion to him, but in order to keep the party alive. (This latter point most of the diligent convention reporters missed.) This sentiment demanded a clear program: Nominate Roosevelt and go ahead if he will accept, whether the repub-

licans nominate him or not. If he declines, nominate some one else and keep the party alive.

The progressive executive group opposed this policy for these reasons: First, they were sure that Roosevelt would decline if the republicans nominated Hughes; Second, the chances were then plainly ten to one that Hughes would be nominated (the opposition to Roosevelt being too firm and bitter to expect it to give way); Third, they were convinced that progressive party usefulness was ended and were committed to obtaining progressive support of Hughes if he was nominated. They therefore wished to prevent the placing of a third candidate in the field.

THE PROGRESSIVE INTERNAL FIGHT

Early in the convention a coalition of leaders, representing an overwhelming majority vote, was formed to oppose the executive group whose plans were unknown but whose ultimate intentions were cor-

rectly guessed. This coalition realized, however, that if Roosevelt were nominated prematurely and then rejected by the republicans they would be held responsible for the failure to unite the parties on him. On the other hand it was the firm intention of the great bulk of the delegates that they would not sit passive until Hughes was nominated and then endorse him and go home to face the charge of their outraged friends that they had tried to deliver the party. These delegates led by the coalition leaders, were determined to "put it up to Roosevelt"—to nominate him and leave it to him to make the wisest decision possible. And this they accomplished. But in view of this policy there was much that was unfair in the outburst of resentment which the Roosevelt pronouncement brought forth.

PUTTING IT UP TO ROOSEVELT

It is true that the progressives exhibited a beautiful, but almost childlike, faith in

the accomplishment of miracles by their great leader. Upon Hughes' nomination and immediate acceptance there was absolutely nothing Colonel Roosevelt could do except endorse Hughes or lead a hopeless fight which would simply elect Wilson. A hopeless fight for principle could have been justified. But Roosevelt had long ago determined for his part that the defeat of Wilson was the great necessity for the good of the country; his party leaders had committed themselves (impliedly with his sanction) to the support of Hughes. He would be forced to break faith with his belief in what was best for the nation and to all practical purposes with his own words—to make this hopeless campaign. Any other decision than Roosevelt's declination of the progressive nomination was impossible from the moment that Hughes accepted the republican nomination.

THE DEATH OF THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY

In this brief story of the Progressive Convention, there can be found no reason why the progressives should vote for Wilson or Hughes to preserve the party integrity of progressivism. The election of neither will keep the progressive party alive as a political force, wholly consecrated to the doctrines of progressivism. The election of Hughes will wipe out the last reason for the party's existence, since he can only be elected by progressive votes and his triumph will mean that the progressives are once more in the republican party in controlling numbers.

The election of Wilson will not keep the progressive party alive. Plainly his election, with practically no progressive candidates in the field, will mean that the republican party will be the only existing minority party of effective size and the obvious machinery for all anti-administration politics.

The progressive party became desperately ill in 1914; perhaps miraculous doctoring might have saved its life in 1916; but instead the responsible physicians decided on a major operation and the patient died on the operating table. Groups may form calling themselves progressives —but they will be new organizations of individuals, not even surviving remnants.

For those who believe in progressivism the choice is not one of trying to keep the party dedicated to progressivism alive, but to determine which of the two old parties offers the best field for the political service of the progressive citizen. This question will be considered as "the party choice."

THE PARTY CHOICE

For many the choice of the party with which to vote will be determined by habit. Former republicans after four years of independence, or progressive alignment, will return to the "party of Lincoln." Former democrats similarly will go back to the "party of Jefferson." But there will be many who will seriously consider—particularly in view of the necessity of primary voting—with which party they wish to work in the future. And many will permit a personal liking for Wilson or Hughes to determine this important question.

The choice of a political party should be a serious one for all first voters and all progressives about to determine a new and probably lasting allegiance. The character of the immediate party leader is an

influential factor, but it has not the lasting importance to the voter that the character of the party has.

RAYMOND ROBINS' CHOICE

A most interesting political document is Raymond Robins' statement to the progressives explaining why he, a former democrat, has become a republican and answering the question:

"In which of these dominant parties in the long run will progressive principles find most effective support, and where will the rank and file and leadership of the progressive party find largest co-operation in the service of our common country?"

And the text of his answer is in these words:

"Platforms change with each campaign and leaders come and go. Should we not consider that drift of opinion—almost glacial in slowness and certainty—whereby the permanent voting mass in each party

inevitably determines the topography of our political world?"

As an up-to-date presentation of the pro-republican answer to this question from a man of unbiased judgment and broad political experience the following extracts from the Robins statement of August 5, 1916, are offered:

PROGRESSIVE VICTORIES

"Let us now turn to the test of actual achievements in progressive legislation and administration. The freest and most progressive state in this union is California. Eight years ago it was a rotten borough and had been under shameless and corrupt corporation and boss control for a generation. Twenty years ago able and honest progressive democrats were fighting in that state for reform. They led in the education of the people but the rank and file of the democratic party refused to follow their leadership. How was the actual deliverance of California achieved?

By the rank and file of the republican voters under the leadership of Hiram W. Johnson. The second freest state in this union is Wisconsin. Twenty years ago the brewery ring of Milwaukee and the railroad ring of Madison controlled that state. Which party redeemed Wisconsin? The rank and file of the republican party under the leadership of Robert M. LaFollette. After long years of shameless corruption and misgovernment Pennsylvania has made a notable advance toward decent government and progressive policies in the last two years. Here again the rank and file of the republican voters under the leadership of Governor Brumbaugh is breaking boss control of government in the Keystone State. When New Hampshire broke the bonds of her railroad ring how was that victory won? Through Robert P. Bass and Winston Churchill supported by the rank and file of the republican party.

THE LESSON FROM ILLINOIS

"My home State of Illinois is an illuminating example of the general experience. We have had able progressive democratic leadership and within the past decade have won both the city and the state governments. Yet permanent gains for progressive principles have been practically nil. A fatal incapacity for efficient administration or fundamental progressive legislation seems to rest upon the democratic party in Illinois. After sixteen years, during twelve of which I served with the progressive democrats, the democratic party is more completely under the control of a corporation boss who represents the worst in our political system than at any other time in twenty years. The present administration at Washington has helped rather than hindered the growth of this boss control of the democratic party in Illinois. The progressive democrats of Illinois are a heartsick mi-

nority. The progressive republicans are a militant—and properly organized—will be a triumphant majority. The final regeneration of the government of this State will have to be won by the leadership of progressives in the republican party supported by its rank and file.

NATIONAL PROGRESS

"When the hour came to break the control of the corrupt plutocracy and the bosses over the national government, again it was the rank and file of the progressive republican voters that sustained the leadership in the White House and Congress which laid the foundation of effective progressive opinion and finally culminated in the revolt of 1912. It was the fear of this progressive spirit that nominated Mr. Wilson over the choice of the democratic rank and file in the Baltimore convention; that maintained President Wilson's control over Congress; that dictated the progressive planks in the democratic platform

in St. Louis and nominated Mr. Hughes in the republican convention at Chicago. It was progressive republicans that furnished 95% of the leadership and 80% of the voters for the progressive candidates in 1912.

THE STATES' RIGHTS DOCTRINE

"More and more it becomes plain that most of our pressing problems of large import are national in scope and will yield only to national action. Yet we find in the democratic party the modern, and let us hope the last, stronghold of the advocates of loyal sovereignty. This doctrine of individualism, sectionalism, and disunion menaced and almost prevented the freeing of the colonies from foreign dominion. This doctrine well nigh defeated the adoption of a unifying constitution wherein the American nation became a fact. This doctrine after sixty years almost overthrew the national structure in dissension over the issue of slavery. This

doctrine since the Civil War has delayed national legislation so urgently needed to solve the problems of pure food, transportation, child labor and conservation. Wherever the fight for more efficient and more humane government has been waged this baneful doctrine of States Rights has been invoked to rally and shelter the anti-social forces, to arouse sectional bias, local jealousy and all mean, narrow passions that hold men's eyes upon the ground when great human needs call upon them to look beyond the rough and dusty roads to the far country that is worth the toil and sacrifice of the long, hard journey.

SECTIONALISM OR NATIONALISM?

"Comprehending our national necessities, how can a progressive hesitate long to choose between the party of nationalism and the party of sectionalism? Should not wise and sincere progressives go en masse into the republican primaries, and fighting shoulder to shoulder with progressive

republicans, help and be helped in our common struggle for social and industrial justice in city, state and nation? If this is generally done the common bonds of our fellowship for the past four years will not be broken but rather augmented, and we can continue to work together and bring back a chastened republican party to its ancient faith in human rights and national integrity, which made its triumph under Lincoln's leadership the supreme achievement of the democratic spirit in the history of mankind."

THE DEMOCRATIC REPLY

From the pro-democratic point of view it will be argued about as follows:

1. The democratic party under Wilson has put through a great program of national progressive legislation—from the Federal Reserve Act to the Anti-Child Labor Act.

2. The democratic party is working

away from sectionalism toward nationalism as shown by the Wilson legislation.

3. The rank and file of the democracy are the workers—the group where radicalism is natural—while the middle class rank and file of the republican party will be slow to approve of experiments in government that may threaten their comfortable condition in the established order.

4. The great financial interests have always been powerful in the republican party and the protective tariff has been the "mother of privilege."

5. The progressive republicans were defeated in their party and forced to form a separate party to obtain freedom to be politically effective. Why should they return to the party which they rejected in 1912?

THE PRACTICAL ARGUMENT

Beyond the theoretical argument is the practical one—there are more progressive republicans than progressive democrats.

Therefore, if one would be politically effective, he is likely to go where he has the most friends rather than where he has the fewest. There is still another consideration. If progressive leadership were more powerful in one party than in the other, it might compensate for lack of numbers. But there is no democratic leadership compensating for republican numerical strength. A mental comparison of the names of the national leaders of progressive thought will show an overwhelming preponderance of republicans.

THE NATURAL DRIFT

On the party issue it is fairly certain that a large proportion of progressive-independents will incline to the republican ticket. One question alone will turn this drift and that is a comparison between Wilson and Hughes, wherein a desire to approve Wilson's progressive legislation will be supported by an uncertainty as to just where Hughes stands. If it

becomes plain that Hughes is essentially progressive-minded and will militantly support a progressive program, the drift will be toward him. But uncertainty as to his attitude may turn a major number toward Wilson, despite their republican inclinations.

"MINOR" ISSUES

The "minor" issues of this campaign include some of the most important ever before the American people. They are only called "minor" because, between parties and candidates as the platforms and speeches define the issues, clear and marked differences in policy have failed to appear.

FOREIGN POLICY

The most notable example is on the question of international relations. Here by all logic there should be a great issue. We are in a time of unexampled complications in foreign relations. We lack definite assurances of just what Wilson's policies are after two years of controversy with foreign governments. In regard to Mexico, Hughes denies that there is any settled foreign policy, and argues that if

one were defined by Wilson it would not be adhered to for six months. But there is no alternative of republican policy presented. Firm generalities and lofty statements of principle have been the mental food of the American people in the matter of international relations for two years and the offer of more of the same material, differently phrased, does not make a campaign issue. In fact—to carry the metaphor a bit further—more of the same diet induces a slight, but noticeable, nausea.

There is a certain unwillingness to discuss candidly our foreign relations which may arise from the cosmopolitan character of the voting population. In these troublous days clear expressions of opinion on any international subject are almost certain to arouse the hostility of some of our "neutral" citizens, whose sympathy with one or another belligerent nation amounts to an almost fanatic support of all its acts, even when in conflict with American rights.

It appears likely that the campaign issue which should perhaps be the greatest (America's foreign policy) will be the least clearly made. If this issue is really made it will dwarf all others, but at present it bids fair to remain to the end a "minor" issue.

CONSERVATION AND MONOPOLY

Conservation and monopoly are names that raise memories of great campaign battles. Nor are these issues dead. They are vital problems of the nation. But each national election turns on a few of the many crowding problems each administration must face and all others become for the moment of minor interest. The greatest problem of Wilson's administration has been our foreign policy, yet nothing received less attention in the campaign of 1912 in which Wilson was elected after a three-cornered battle of unusual ferocity over exclusively domestic policies. So it may follow that the election of 1916 will

be swung on issues which will play little part in the next administration.

The effort of this writing has been to consider—not those issues necessarily of most real importance—but those which are likely to receive most attention during the campaign and upon which probably a decisive number of independent voters will turn the election in favor of Wilson or Hughes. Other issues, therefore, though of great importance to individual voters or to the future of America, must be for the present consideration classed as "minor" issues.

WHO WINS?

There is no intention to attempt prophecy in considering, upon the issues just presented, who will win in November. It is only intended here to summarize the logical drift of independent, progressive voters on these issues. It is not suggested that the voters will be logical. Probably a major number will decide on those temporary emotions which we dignify with the name of "instincts." They will "feel friendly" to Hughes or Wilson or to the local politician who assists them with a bit of "influence" when they wish to indulge in our national habit of minor law-breaking. But a certain number of voters do wish to feel that they are logical in their balloting and for such it may be interesting to estimate how the majority of them might be expected to vote after

weighing candidates and parties against the dominant issues of the campaign.

SUMMARY

Mexico

Wilson's record is very weak, but on the whole about what a majority of the people have wanted. First, expressing moral wrath against Huerta; second, taking a high-sounding stand for international righteousness; and, third, avoiding any great trouble or expense by evading responsibilty for the results of our "Mexican policy."

Hughes' position is much stronger, more nationally selfish and with the critical power of hindsight; on the whole what will be regarded as statesmanship, and entitled to public approval, although not secretly as much approved as the Wilsonian idea of "keeping out of trouble at almost any cost." The balance on the Mexican issue will favor Wilson if there

are no more embarrassing complications, and may swing toward Hughes if the Mexican question becomes acute and distressing before November.

Preparedness

In default of a distinctive program from Hughes and popular education in its favor, Wilson will be favored on this issue—not because he should be, but because of the failure of the other side to make a clear issue through a real opposition program.

Americanism

This issue can only become acute through offensive activity in behalf of Hughes along lines of foreign blood and sympathy. A flat repudiation of such support by Hughes may take away this danger. If it remains the entire campaign may be swung in a rush of prejudice upon the lines of the European conflict. In this event Wilson will be elected.

Tariff

The democratic tariff making with its stupidity and sectionalism plainly gives the balance on this issue to the republicans.

Woman Suffrage

Hughes' declaration in favor of a constitutional amendment for suffrage gives him a marked advantage on this issue, which is increased by the traditional opposition of a states' rights democracy to any interference with state control of suffrage qualifications. The vote of the negro woman is no more desired in the South than the vote of the negro man.

Labor

Wilson's record, combined with the preponderance of democrats in the wage-earning groups, gives him a decided advantage on this issue. Certain reactionary republican leaders increase this advantage for their opponents by their known and

repeated hostility to organized labor. Hughes himself is entitled to better consideration by labor than he will probably get.

Efficiency

On this issue—not a very strong one—Hughes and the republican party will profit by comparison of the records of the candidates and parties.

Progressivism

Hughes will receive a majority of the former progressive votes unless additional activity by Wilson in the nature of his Supreme bench appointments, the child labor bill and his actions in the matter of the railroad strike win over the independents who are inclined to support Hughes but are waiting further demonstration of his progressiveness.

The Party Choice

On this issue a large majority of progressive-independents will incline toward

the republican party. Only exceptional weakness in the Hughes campaign and some striking successes for the Wilson administration will change this plain and important drift back to republicanism.

CONCLUSION

There are too many uncertain factors in this campaign for any true non-partisan to make up his mind as to his presidential choice on *all* the issues two months before election. If *one* of a few of the above issues is decisive with the voter he might determine his balloting now, but on *several* his choice would inevitably wait upon the further sharpening of these issues in the oratorical battle when Wilson and Bryan, Hughes and Roosevelt, and other national leaders are all actively engaged in hammering home the campaign arguments from a hundred platforms.

It is merely the attempt of this writing to condense and simplify the main issues in order that the interested citizen may listen through hours of campaign buncombe for those revealing minutes when the speakers state, or avoid stating, a posi-

tion of real importance to the unbiased voter. In no sense are the issues completely, or even adequately, considered. The effort has been simply to put up a few guideposts—not to present a map of the country, or to advise as to desirable roads. If the guideposts aid a few political wanderers, who know where they want to go but are uncertain as to what roads lead in the desired direction, this writing will have served its purpose.

Books That Really Teach

you the things you want to know, and in a simple, practical way that you can understand

Our illustrated catalogue, which will be sent you free upon request, tells all about the Practical Mechanical Books for Home Study that we publish.

There are popular priced books on the operation of trains and station work, practical mechanical drawing and machine designing, pattern making, electrical railroading, power stations, automobiles, gas engines, electrical wiring, armature and magnet winding, dynamo tending, elementary electricity, wireless telegraphy and telephony, carpentry and architecture, concrete construction, plumbing and heating, sign and house painting, amusements, etc., etc.

No matter what your ambition or desire for knowledge may be, we publish books **written by authorities in their different lines** that will give you just the training and information that you want and need.

Write today for this up-to-date and complete illustrated catalogue and popular price list. It is free.

FREDERICK J. DRAKE & CO.

PUBLISHERS OF SELF-EDUCATIONAL BOOKS

1006 Michigan Avenue CHICAGO

Frederick J. Drake & Company's

CATALOGUE OF

Standard Up-to-Date Hand Books on the following Subjects:

Dialogues, Recitations, Tableaux,
Charades, Pantomimes, Mock Trials,
Monologues, Drills, Marches, Minstrel
and Entertainment Books, Magic,
Palmistry, Hypnotism, Black Art,
Electricity, Speakers, Poultry,
Letter Writers, Dream Books,
Fortune Tellers, Popular Dramas,
Photography, Etiquette, Dancing,
Etc., Etc., Etc., Etc.

Each book in this list is the work of a competent specialist, and will be found reliable, practical and thoroughly up-to-date.

Any Book Advertised in This Catalogue Sent Postpaid, on Receipt of Price.
FREDERICK J. DRAKE & CO.

B
RD-1

DOBBS BROS.
LIBRARY BINDING

OCT 82
ST. AUGUSTINE
FLA.
32084

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
0 028 001 822 3